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COMMENT 4 
ABsTRAcr. Three aspects of Fisher's {1995) logical analysis are criticized: 
(a) his tendency to separate and polarize points of view in such a way that 
he provides a misconstrued picture of social constructionism, {b) his 
adherence to a Cartesian view, with the implication that unity and 
multiplicity, like continuity and discontinuity, are treated as mutually 
exclusive rather than as coexistent features of the self, and (c) his 
conception that narrative has no basis in the body. 
I have read Fisher's (1995) contribution with mixed feelings. Concerned as 
he is with the agency, unity and continuity of the self, he covers an 
admirable range of theoretical and philosophical literature on the subject, 
and challenges us to reflect on basic features of the self. At the same time, 
however, I have to conclude that he is representing a particular (and rather 
limited) stream of thought that can be labeled as (neo-)Cartesian. His 
criticism of social constructionism, as represented by the writings of 
Gergen, Harre and Shotter, is given from that specific angle and, as a 
consequence, is heavily coloured by it. Such a criticism is a relative one, 
that is, it says as much about Fisher's philosophical position as it has to say 
about social constructionism. Given this relativity, I comment on three 
features that emanate from Fisher's specific perspective: (a) his tendency 
to separate and polarize points of view, resulting in a caricature of social 
constructionism, (b) his attempt to preserve a Cartesian view of the self, 
with the implication that continuity and discontinuity, unity and multi-
plicity are treated as mutually exclusive instead of coexistent in the 
functioning self, and (c) his treatment of body and narrative as mutually 
exclusive, thereby failing to see the far-reaching implications of the notion 
of 'voice' as an expression of an embodied mind. 
Differentiation Instead of Polarization 
It is Fisher's purpose to argue 'that social constructionists do not account 
for the self, sabotage their own criteria for personal identity and make it 
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impossible to sustain a concept of the person' (p. 324). Let us, in order to 
get at a more differentiated picture, look, for example, at Harre and Van 
Langenhove's (1991) plea for the concept of positioning, which they 
present as a dynamic alternative to the more static concept of role. 
Moral and Personal Positioning 
A 'position' in a conversation, for example, is a metaphorical concept 
through reference to which a person's social and personal attributes as a 
speaker are compendiously collected. It is possible to position oneself or to 
be positioned as powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant 
or submissive. Positioning is part of the discursive construction of personal 
stories that make a person's actions intelligible and relatively determinate 
as social acts. 
In providing their arguments for the concept of positioning, Harre and 
Van Langenhove (1991) make a distinction between 'moral positioning' 
and 'personal positioning'. Moral positions refer typically to the roles 
people occupy within a given moral order or to certain institutional aspects 
of social life. When Smith is a patient and Jones a nurse, it is perfectly clear 
for both parties when the first asks the second to make her bed. Thus far 
the conversation between them is organized purely on the basis of role 
expectations. However, when Smith asks Jones why she has not made her 
bed yet as she asked her to do, then the story-line between them is likely to 
shift from moral to personal positioning. In order to answer Smith's 
question, Jones can no longer refer to her role as a nurse only. She will 
have to bring in a story that accounts for the deviance of what was expected 
from her on the basis of her role. Such a story is likely to contain individual 
particularities (e.g. 'I'm sorry I forgot to make your bed, but I'm a bit 
confused today as I just received a letter in which ... '). This example, 
described by Harre and Van Langenhove (1991), shows that the terms 
'position' and 'positioning' are sensitive not only to role-related behaviour 
but also to individual properties and particularities. When Fisher holds that 
the social constructionists' formulations are 'neo-Meadian' (p. 330), and 
that specific terms (e.g. 'roles', 'speaking' and 'narrative structures') are 
hard to disambiguate from Mead's 'generalized other' (p. 330), then such a 
crude qualification is hardly compatible with Harre's distinction between 
'moral positioning' and 'personal positioning'. 
Agency and Responsibility 
Similar remarks can be made concerning Gergen's and Shatter's contri-
butions. In a thorough discussion of impasses and evolutions in the 
psychology of the self, Gergen (1984) says: 
How is one to evaluate the general shift from mechanistic to agential 
explanations in the history of self-inquiry? Surely from the broad cultural 
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standpoint there is much to be applauded. Many would argue that the 
concepts of duty, right, obligation, morality, choice, freedom, and 
responsibility have played an enormously important role in the emergence 
of civilized culture. All are obviated if the concept of agency is lost from 
the vocabulary of understanding persons. (p. 77) 
In giving this comment, Gergen approvingly refers to the work of Shotter 
(1975) on the 'images of man' in psychological research. 
A quotation as given above clearly contradicts Fisher's statement that 
social constructionists 'eclipse individual rights and existences as selves and 
persons' (p. 344). Of course, more examples could be given, representing 
contradictions between the writings of Gergen, Harre and Shotter, on the 
one hand, and the polarizing statements by Fisher, on the other. Instead of 
giving more examples, it seems more fertile to pose the second issue, the 
mutual exclusion of unity and multiplicity and of continuity and disconti-
nuity. 
Unity and Multiplicity Coexist 
Apparently, Fisher perceives a contradiction between the social construc-
tionists' emphasis on the multiplicity of narrative perspectives and his 
conception of the unity of the self. In opposition to this view of mutual 
exclusion of unity and multiplicity, I want to demonstrate that (a) unity and 
multiplicity coexist in the functioning self, and (b) it is certainly not 
necessary to lapse into a Cartesian position in order to prevent the self 
from losing its unity. 
Bakhtin's Polyphonic Novel 
Bakhtin (1929/1973), whose contribution is closely related with the basic 
premises of social constructionism, has explicitly dealt with the relation 
between unity and multiplicity. Bakhtin has put forward the thesis that 
Dostoevsky-one of the most brilliant innovators in novelistic literature 
-created a new form of artistic thought, the polyphonic novel. Such a 
novel is composed of a number of independent and mutually opposing 
viewpoints embodied by characters involved in dialogical relationships. 
Each character is 'ideologically authoritative and independent', that is, 
each character is perceived as the author of his or her own ideological 
position, not as an object of Dostoevsky's all-encompassing artistic 
conception. In this multiplicity of characters and their points of view, 
Dostoevsky himself is only one of many. Instead of being 'obedient slaves' 
in the service of Dostoevsky's intentions, the different characters are 
capable of standing beside their creator, disagreeing with the author, even 
rebelling against him. 
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The hero in Dostoevsky's novels (e.g. Raskolnikov, Myshkin, Stavrogin, 
Ivan Karamazov) is not simply the object of Dostoevsky's finalizing artistic 
vision, but comes across as the author of his own ideology. Instead of a 
multitude of characters subordinated to Dostoevsky's individual vision, 
there is 'a plurality of consciousnesses', represented by voices who 
articulate their own position. As in a polyphonic composition, the several 
voices or instruments have different spatial positions and accompany and 
oppose each other in a dialogical relation. It is the dialogical relation 
among the several voices that creates coherence and unity in the story as a 
whole. In other words, in a polyphonic novel the different characters imply 
multiplicity, the act of dialogue guarantees their coherence and unity (for 
the relevance of coherence in narrative thought, see also Gergen & 
Gergen, 1988). 
Logical vs Dialogical Relationships 
Fisher's contribution appears to me to be a strictly logical analysis of the 
structure of the self. It may, therefore, be elucidating to establish the 
difference between logical and dialogical relationships. Bakhtin (1929/ 
1973; see also Vasil'eva, 1988) gives an example of two phrases that are 
completely identical, 'life is good' and again 'life is good'. In terms of 
Aristotelian logic, these two phrases are related in terms of identity; they 
are, in fact, one and the same statement. From a dialogical point of view, 
however, they may be considered as two remarks expressed by the voices 
of two spatially separated people in communication, who in this case 
entertain a relationship of agreement. The two phrases are identical from a 
logical point of view, but different as utterances: the first is a statement, the 
second a confirmation. In a similar way the phrases 'life is good' and 'life is 
not good' can be elaborated. In terms of logic, one is a negation of the 
other. However, as utterances from two different speakers, there is a 
dialogical relation of disagreement. Bakhtin holds that the relationship of 
agreement and disagreement is, like question and answer, basically 
dialogical. Note that Bakhtin does not reject the rules of logic: 'Dialogical 
relationships are totally impossible without logical and concrete semantic 
relationships, but they are not reducible to them; they have their own 
specificity' (p. 152). 
The Self from a Dialogical Perspective 
On the basis of Bakhtin's notion of the polyphonic novel, Hermans, 
Kempen and Van Loon (1992) conceptualized the self in terms of a 
dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous !-positions in an imaginal 
landscape: 
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The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, from one position to the 
other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates 
among different and even opposed positions. The I has the capacity to 
imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations 
between positions can be established. The voices function like interacting 
characters in a story. Once a character is set in motion in a story, the 
character takes on a life of its own and thus assumes a certain narrative 
necessity. Each character has a story to tell about experiences from its 
own stance. As different voices these characters exchange information 
about their respective Mes and their worlds, resulting in a complex, 
narratively structured self. (pp. 28-29} 
In the conceptualization phrased above, the multiplicity of the self does 
not result in fragmentation, because it is the same I that is moving back and 
forth between several positions. Thanks to this identity, the 'invariance of 
the self' that is so much of a concern to Fisher is preserved. In other words, 
variance and invariance, or continuity and discontinuity, coexist in the 
functioning self. Indeed, it is one and the same I 'who runs the house' 
(Fisher, p. 333). 
On the basis of the coexistence of continuity and discontinuity, it is 
possible to make a meaningful distinction between the normal multiplicity 
of the mind and the abnormal state of multiple personality. As Watkins 
(1986) has argued, in the case of the fragmented self of a multiple 
personality patient, there is no imaginal dialogue, only sequential mono-
logue. At some moment in time, the person identifies with or is taken over 
by only one character, which dominates the self. Paradoxically, the illness 
of multiple personality is problematic because of its singleness of voice at 
any one moment, not because of its multiplicity. In the normal case there is 
enough 'invariance of the self' to synthesize the experiences that result 
from the temporal changes the self goes through (see also Harre, 1991). 
The Self as a Personal Consciousness 
In dialogical relationships, the communicating voices are highly personal. 
Bakhtin (1929/1973) observes that Dostoevsky's world is 'profoundly 
personalized' and that each character is a 'concrete consciousness, em-
bodied in the living voice of an integral person' (p. 7). A particular 
utterance is never isolated from the consciousness of a particular character. 
And because one particular character is always implicitly or explicitly 
responding to another character, 'a dialogical reaction personifies every 
utterance to which it reacts' (p. 152). 
In the above summary of Bakhtin's view, several notions come together 
that play a central role in Fisher's contribution: person, consciousness and 
unity (integrity). In Bakhtin's view these notions do not contradict in any 
way the notions of narrative, voice and multiplicity that are described by 
Fisher as typical properties of the social constructionist approach. 
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The Thorny Problem of the Body's Relation to the Self 
In his discussion of the role of the body, Fisher holds that for social 
constructionists thought is 'more Meadian than Mead was ready to allow' 
(p. 330). Fisher explains that for Mead personal beliefs can be a function of 
basic attitudinal tendencies, inherent in personal biological nature. In this 
way Mead creates a loophole that allows him to juxtapose mind/body 
concepts (Fisher, pp. 329-330). Arguing that the social constructionists 
eliminate Mead's loophole, Fisher gives as an example the way social 
constructionists deal with emotions: 'Emotions are not tied to the body-
rather they are historically determined by social values and narratives' 
(p. 330). Apparently, Fisher sees a contradiction between notions of the 
body and narrative accounts of the self. In the following, I present three 
arguments why I think Fisher goes too far in separating body from 
narrative. 
First, advocates of a narrative approach have not only emphasized the 
role of time, but also argued that space is an intrinsic constituent of 
narrative. Bruner (1986) proposes that the narrative mode strives to put 
the (general) human condition into the particulars of experience, and 
attempts to locate experience in time and space (p. 13). Sarbin (1986) also 
considers the narrative as a way of organizing episodes, actions and 
accounts of actions in time and space, and as an achievement that brings 
together mundane facts and fantastic creations (p. 9). These statements are 
in apparent contradiction with a Cartesian perspective. For Descartes, the 
self is part of thinking (res cogitans), whereas the body is part of extension 
(res extensa). In other words, for Descartes, spatial characteristics do not 
belong to the self. For the narrativists, on the contrary, spatial character-
istics are intrinsic to narrative conceptions of the self. 
Second, the notion of (embodied) voice is closely related to narrative 
because narratives assume a communicative context. That is, there is a 
person who tells a story and a person who listens to it. Conceived in this 
way, telling a story is a dialogical act and the person who tells the story is a 
dialogical narrator (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). For Bakhtin, the notion 
of dialogue makes it possible to differentiate the inner world of one and the 
same individual in the form of an interpersonal relationship. By transform-
ing an 'inner' thought of a particular character into a (bodily) utterance, 
dialogical relations spontaneously occur between this utterance and the 
utterance of imaginal others. Dostoevsky's novel The Double may serve as 
an example. In this novel the second hero (the double) was introduced as a 
personification of the interior voice of the first hero (Golyadkin). The 
interior voice of the first hero is externalized in a spatially separated 
opponent, and this instigates a full-fledged dialogue between two indepen-
dent characters. In Bakhtin's (1929/1973) terms: 'This persistent urge to 
see all things as being coexistent and to perceive and depict all things side 
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by side and simultaneously, as if in space rather than time, leads him 
[Dostoevsky] to dramatize in space even the inner contradictions and 
stages of development of a single person' (p. 23; emphasis added). 
Third, the developmental origin of dialogical narratives is in bodily acts 
of echo and imitation. As Fogel (1993) has observed, newborns are able to 
imitate some simple gestures like mouth opening and tongue protrusion. 
Seeing the mouth of the mother, the child knows how to move its own 
mouth. This is certainly a peculiar achievement, as in this period of life the 
infant does not have a mirror-like body image of itself. This suggests that 
early in life, prelinguistic forms of dialogue, in the form of imitative acts, 
play a central role in the functioning of the body. 
Taken together, I am impressed with Fisher's thorough and extensive 
contribution as far as it emphasizes basic features of the self. My main 
problem is that, in his logical analysis, he seems to establish separations 
and polarizations in such a way that he fails to reach his own goal, the 
integration and synthesis of the self. 
References 
Bakhtin, M. (1973). Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (2nd ed.; R.W. Rotsel, 
Trans.). New York: Ardis. (Original work published 1929.) 
Bruner, J.S. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Fisher, H. (1995). Whose right is it to define the self? Theory & Psychology, 5, 323-
352. 
Fogel, A. (1993). Developing through relationships. Heme! Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Gergen, K.J. (1984). Theory of the self: Impasse and evolution. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 49-115. 
Gergen, K.J., & Gergen, M.M. (1988). Narrative and the self as relationship. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 17-56. 
Harre, R. (1991). The discursive production of selves. Theory & Psychology, 1, 51-
63. 
Harre, R., & Van Langenhove, L. (1991). Varieties of positioning. Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, 21, 393-407. 
Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1993). The dialogical self: Meaning as 
movement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Hermans, H.J.M., Kempen, H.J.G., & Van Loon, R.J.P. (1992). The dialogical 
self: Beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47, 23-33. 
Sarbin, T.R. (1986). The narrative as a root metaphor for psychology. In T.R. 
Sarbin (Ed.), Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct (pp. 3-
21). New York: Praeger. 
Shotter, J. (1975). Images of man in psychological research. London: Methuen. 
Vasil'eva, 1.1. (1988). The importance of M.M. Bakhtin's idea of dialogue and 
dialogic relations for the psychology of communication. Soviet Psychology, 26, 
17-31. 
 at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on March 10, 2015tap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
382 LIMITATIONS OF LOGIC IN DEFINING THE SELF 
Watkins, M. (1986). Invisible guests: The development of imaginal dialogues. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
HUBERT J.M. HERMANS is Professor of Personality Psychology at the 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Originally publishing on 
achievement motivation and fear of failure, he constructed several 
psychometric tests to measure these motives in adults and children. In the 
mid-1970s he turned away from this field and formulated a theory of the 
self, called 'Valuation Theory', and devised, in accordance with this 
theory, a method of self-confrontation. This theory and method have 
been published in a variety of American and European psychological 
journals in the 1980s and 1990s. His most recent interest is in the 
dialogical nature of the self (American Psychologist, January 1992). 
Publications include The Dialogical Self Meaning as Movement (with 
Harry Kempen, Academic Press, 1993) and Self-Narratives: The 
Construction of Meaning in Psychotherapy (with Els Hermans-Jansen, 
Guilford Press, 1995). ADDRESS: Department of Clinical Psychology 
and Personality, Montessorilaan 3, 6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
(e-mail: hhermans@psych.kun.nl). 
